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Abstract
We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme
FOA (Final Oer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we
proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Of-
fer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a negotiation without
arbitration. We observe that the ROC mechanism seems to cumulate the advantages
of the two other procedures, it avoids the high frequency of impasses observed under
the FOA procedure and it is as ecient as the Free procedure in this respect. Further-
more, in an asymmetric treatment, it helps the subjects to find an agreement on the
equal split of the surplus, like the arbitrator of the FOA procedure does, but without
imposing anything on them.
1 Introduction
We talk about arbitration mechanism when two parties fail to reach agreement in nego-
tiations and have recourse to arbitration by a neutral third party. The objective of these
mechanisms is to provide a solution to bargaining impasses and avoid the ineciency due
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to too long process of negotiation or a failure. Final Oer Arbitration (FOA) is one of
the best known mechanisms. It is used, for example, for the settlement of commercial
disputes, to settle grievances in union-management contracts (for a variety of examples
see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984)), but also at the international level to resolve disputes
between countries in the framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. FOA has been
proposed by Steven (1996) to solve a problem encountered with another well knownmech-
anism, Conventional Oer Arbitration (COA). Indeed, an empirical literature had pointed
out what was called the ”chilling eect”: the simple fact that COA is made available to the
parties increases the frequency of deadlocks. The arbitration mechanism erodes agents’
incentive to make concessions in bargaining and their proposed settlements remain distant
from each other.
Steven proposed to solve this perverse eect by exploiting the parties’ risk aversion. In
COA, the arbitrator has the power to impose a settlement of his choice on the bargaining
agents if their negotiations break down, that is if their demands are not compatible. In FOA
the arbitrator chooses among the proposals the one he wishes to impose. Stevens’ idea was
that: ”... [FOA] generates just the kind of uncertainty about the location of the arbitration
awards that is well calculated to recommend maximum notions of prudence to the parties
and, hence, compel them to seek security in agreement” (Stevens 1966 page 46). On the
basis of this theoretical proposal, this procedure has been applied to settle public sector
labor disputes in several U.S. state jurisdictions (see Hebdon (1996)). It turned out that
this mechanism had to be implemented, meaning that the bargaining parties did not reach
an agreement by themselves.
Indeed, several models in the literature show that Stevens’ intuition was wrong. The
results depend on the parties’ belief as to the arbitrator’s preference. Farber (1980, 1981)
and Farber and Katz (1980) consider that the parties are uncertain as to the arbitrator’s
preference. They show that the two dierent mechanisms COA and FOA lead to dierent
results which depend on the parties’ attitude toward risk. However, the so called chill-
ing eect persists. In addition, the comparison of the two kinds of mechanism has been
the subject of experiments (see for example Ashenfelter et alii (1992), Dickinson (2006),
Kriticos (2006)) which reinforce this theoretical result just mentioned. However, under
some conditions FOA does eliminate the chilling eect. Crawford (1979) studied the case
in which both parties know with certainty the arbitrator’s preferred outcome and concluded
that under this assumption both arbitration mechanisms support in fact the same outcome
at the Nash equilibrium. Proposals are not compatible at the equilibrium of the COA but
are compatible with FOA. However, ”...there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in FOA,
which leads to the feasible final settlement considered most reasonable by the arbitrator,
without regard to the bargaining agents’ preferences”. Page 135. Under the threat of ar-
bitration, the parties are not really involved in a real process of bargaining but are just
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trying to conform to the arbitrator’s preferred outcome or, as Crawford says, the parties
”do not negotiate in good faith”. This result has been confirmed recently in the framework
of bargaining theory by Manzini and Mariotti (2001).
In the opposite case in which a judge or an arbitrator does not have a preferred outcome
to impose on the parties, we show in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008))
that the chilling eect is maximized under COA and FOA. Then, the role of the arbitrator
is reduced to splitting the pie into two equal halves in the case of the COA or to flipping
a coin in the case of the FOA. If this is common knowledge to the parties, they have an
incentive to persist with extreme proposals and the chilling eect is maximal. Indeed, it is
precisely in such situations that negotiation is useful.
In Tanimura and Thoron (2008) we propose a new mechanism, ROC (Recursive Of-
fer Conciliation). In a game theoretical framework, we show that ROC gives the parties
to a negotiation the incentive to make concessions until they reach an agreement. More
precisely, at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a sequential bargaining game gov-
erned by ROC, the parties make gradual concessions which converge to the Raia solution
(Raia (1953)). This mechanism is especially well suited to situations in which a judge or
an arbitrator does not have a preferred outcome to impose on the parties. Our analysis fo-
cused on the role of the parties’ risk aversion in the negotiation as pointed out by Stevens.
In the mechanism we proposed, which is a modified version of FOA, the incentive to reach
agreement is based on the fact that incompatible oers lead to uncertainty as to outcomes
and players who are risk averse may prefer to modify their oers to obtain sure payos.
However, Stevens’ intuition as to the role of risk aversion is only validated in ROC because
of the recursivity of the mechanism. We specify a sequential bargaining game. When the
proposals are not compatible, the bargaining parties have the possibility of opting out by
implementing the ROC mechanism. In the spirit of FOA, ROC chooses one or the other of
the two proposals. However, a first dierence between FOA and ROC is that in the latter, a
lottery draws with equal probability each party’s proposal. A second dierence is that the
resulting proposal cannot be imposed on the other party since he has the right to reject it.
Indeed, contrary to FOA, the ROC mechanism is not compulsory. The third dierence is
that the mechanism allows the parties to record the sequence of not compatible proposals.
Thanks to this history of disagreements there may be several possibilities when a party
decides to opt out. For example, if a party rejects the proposal which has been drawn by
the lottery, the mechanism goes back to implement a lottery with the previous proposals.
Thus, it is only if all the proposals are rejected that the negotiation ends in failure. In this
paper, we present a series of experiments we ran in order to compare our mechanism with
FOA. A first objective is to verify that, in the laboratory like in theory, ROC allows to
eliminate the chilling eect generated by FOA.
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Since ROC is a non compulsory mechanism, it has to be compared also with a negotia-
tion procedure without arbitration. In the literature on bargaining theory, as first explained
in the seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982), discounting is an important driving force in a
negotiation. However, risk aversion is also considered as an important incentive. Myerson
(1991) proposed a sequential bargaining game without discounting and with a finite hori-
zon, in which one of two parties is drawn randomly at each period to make a proposal. We
will use this simple and elegant game as a theoretical benchmark for a free negotiation.
Myerson shows that, at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of his game, the two parties
reach an ecient agreement immediately and that this converges to the Raia solution
when the number of periods tends to infinity. The idea is that the first party to make a
proposal gives the other party his certainty equivalent of pursuing in the game. The other
party, because it is risk averse, accepts. However, this nice result depends on a strong as-
sumption: the parties know the maximum number of periods that the negotiation process
can last. The other diculty with this assumption is an experimental one. Indeed, it is well
known that real subjects do not use backward induction which is essential to find the sub-
game perfect equilibrium in Myerson game. Under the ROC mechanism, the parties can
stop the negotiation when ever they wish, either with an agreement or by disagreement.
Yet, thanks to its recursivity, the parties have an incentive to make concessions.
At the equilibrium, the ROC game and the Myerson game generate the same agree-
ment. However, our hypothesis was that it would be easier for real subjects to negotiate
under the ROC procedure than under a procedure close to Myerson’s game. Indeed, if
the rules characterizing the ROC game are more elaborated than the simple rules of the
Myerson game, the rationality needed at the equilibrium seems simpler and more realistic.
Therefore, the second objective of our experiments was to see if ROC could help subjects
to negotiate in comparison with a free procedure, based on the Myerson game.
We propose three procedures in which the subjects are divided into pairs and sequen-
tially in each pair one of the two subjects is chosen to make a proposal. At each step they
can also opt out. What happens if they opt out depends on the procedure. In the Free
procedure the subjects get a threat point payo. In the FOA and ROC procedures the spe-
cific mechanism is implemented. Since risk aversion plays a role in theory, we also ask
the subjects to answer a questionnaire in the spirit of Holt and Laury’s (Holt and Laury
(2002)).
In Section 2, we present the theoretical background. The design of the experiment and
the protocol are described in Section 3. The results are discussed in the following Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical background
The three procedures we are going to compare in our experiment can be modeled in the
framework of bargaining game theory. This theoretical background will be presented in
this section.
2.1 A bargaining game
We consider the following bargaining game. At the status quo, Player 1 and Player 2 have
an endowment of, respectively, x˚ and y˚. They bargain over the partition of a pie of size K.
The possible ways to split the pie are:
f(x; y) : x; y 2 [0;K] and x + y  Kg
in which x is the share of Player 1 and y those of Player 2. Both players are assumed
to be (weakly) risk averse in the sense that they have linear or concave utility functions,
respectively U1 (x) and U2 (y), that are strictly increasing on [0;K]. In terms of possible
utility pairs (u; v) 2 R2, the compact, convex bargaining set S is thus delimited by the
curves u = U1(x˚); v = U2(y˚) and the curve (U1(x);U2(1   x)), x 2 [0;K]. In what follows,
we define a well known cooperative solution of this bargaining game, the Raia solution
(see Raia 1953). Let m1(U2(y)) be the maximum utility Player 1 can get when Player 2
gets y. Consider the following sequence:
U0 = (U10 ;U
2
0) = (U
1(x˚);U2(y˚))
Ut+1 = 1=2  [(m1(U2t );U2t ) + (U1t ;m2(U1t ))]
The Raia solution, as defined in Raia (1953), is the limit of this sequence when t tends
to infinity and recently axiomatic characterizations have been found (Anbarci and Sun
2009, Trockel 2009). The Raia solution depends on the status quo and on the shape of
the utility functions. However, if the two players have the same CRAA (constant relative
ambiguity aversion) utility function, the Raia solution assigns to Player 1 (2) his threat
point payo x˚ (y˚) plus half of the surplus s = K   x˚   y˚. We will call this sharing the
Equal Split of the Surplus (ESS). For example, taking the parameters we will use in the
experiment, K = 22:2, x˚ = 8 and y˚ = 2, we have ESS = (14.1;8.1). When x˚ = y˚ = 0, we
will call the equal split of the surplus simply the Equal Split: ES = (11.1;11.1).
In the following subsections, we will describe three non cooperative sequential bar-
gaining games that share the same basic structure: Each of the two players in turn make
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proposals over at most n periods. Each proposal is denoted by (x; y) in which x (respec-
tively y) is the payment of Player 1 (2), with x + y < K. At each period t, one of the two
players is drawn randomly to make a proposal (xt; yt) that the other player can accept or
reject. If the proposal is accepted, the game ends and the two players get the payos xt
and yt. The three games dier in their description of what happens in case of rejection by
at least one of the players.
2.2 The Myerson game
In the first game, which has been proposed by Myerson (1991), if the proposal is rejected
the next period starts, following the same procedure (see Figure 1). At the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the game, the sequence of proposals coincides with the Raia’s
sequence and the first proposal is accepted immediately (Myerson 1991). At one extreme,
when there is only one period, the game is equivalent to an ultimatum game. The equi-
librium is that the player who is drawn randomly proposes to keep the whole amount K
minus the status quo payo of the opponent who accepts. At the other extreme, when
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Figure 1: Myerson Game
the number of periods tends to infinity, the equilibrium converges towards the Raia so-
lution defined above. Finally, when the number of periods is n, the strategy of Player 1
(respectively 2) is to propose (m1(U2n);U
2
n) (and (U
1
n ;m
2(U1n)) for Player 2). These payos
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coincide with the shares defined at the nth step of the Raia sequence. Whatever the num-
ber of periods, the proposal is always the certainty equivalent of the opponent’s expected
utility from continuing the negotiation and it is always accepted immediately. Therefore,
one interpretation of the Raia sequence is that Ut+1 is the vector of the Players’expected
utilities from negotiating in the Myerson game over t + 1 periods.
2.3 The Final Oer Arbitration game
In this game, the dierence with the Myerson game is as follows. When, at date t, Player i
decides to reject a proposal (x jt ; y
j
t ), he has to make another proposal (xit; y
i
t). Then, the two
players have to decide simultaneously if they want to continue the negotiation or to opt out.
If both players want to continue the next period starts with the same procedure. Otherwise,
an arbitrator draws one of the two proposals (xit; y
i
t) and (x
j
t ; y
j
t ) and the proposal drawn is
imposed on the two players. The equilibrium depends on the arbitrator’s preferences on
the outcome.
In the first situation to consider the arbitrator is a lottery which is perfectly random
and draws the two proposals with equal probabilities. Then, at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium each player proposes at each step to keep K (see Tanimura and Thoron 2008).
There is a maximum chilling eect whatever the date at which the players terminate the
negotiation.
We also consider a second case in which the arbitrator chooses the proposal closer to
his preferred outcome. When the arbitrator’s preferred outcome is common knowledge,
and coincides for example to ESS, at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the players
propose and accept the arbitrator’s preferred outcome (see Manzini and Mariotti 2001 but
also Crawford 1979).
Finally, in an intermediate case, the players have an incomplete information about
the arbitrator’s preferences. They consider that the preferred outcome is drawn from a
distribution centered on the payos at ESS. Then, each player has an incentive to make a
proposal closer to the arbitrator’s expected preferred outcome than his opponent’s one, in
order to increase the probability that it will be chosen in case of arbitration. However, by
doing so, he decreases his payment in case it is chosen. At the equilibrium, the proposals
remain distant from each other but are not extreme (see Farber 1980).
2.4 The Recursive Oer Conciliation game
The game is equivalent to the FOA game, except that, if at least one player has decided
to opt out at step t, and if the lottery has drawn proposal (xit; y
i
t), then, Player j can reject
it. In case of rejection, the lottery draws randomly between (xit 1; y
i
t 1), and (x
i
t 1; y
i
t 1) and
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Figure 2: FOA Game
so forth. The procedure stops as soon as one player has accepted his opponent’s proposal
drawn randomly or at last when the first proposal is reached and rejected, in which case
both players get their threat point payos.
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The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game are described in Tanimura and Thoron
(2008). At each step, Player i proposes to his opponent Player j the certainty equivalent
of his expected payo in case of opting out and this coincides with the Raia sequence.
As a consequence, in case where one of the players opts out, both players always accept
the first proposal drawn randomly by the lottery. The equilibria dier in the date at which
the players opt out. However, it is always better for both players to continue for as long as
possible. The dominant equilibrium converges towards the Raia solution when the num-
ber of periods tends to infinity. When there is a finite number of periods n, at the dominant
equilibrium, the last pair of proposals coincides with Un, the nth elements of the Raia
sequence. Then, the lottery is implemented and the players accept the proposal which is
drawn randomly.
Therefore, at the equilibrium the proposals are identical in the ROC game and in the
Myerson game and coincide in both cases with the Raia sequence. However, while the
first proposal is accepted immediately at the equilibrium of the Myerson game, players
make proposals and counter-proposals as long as they can in the ROC game. This dier-
ence in the dynamics of the negotiating process is a consequence of the dierence in the
way the game is solved in each case. In the Myerson game, under the assumption that the
players are perfectly farsighted, they solve the game by backward induction. In the ROC
game, the players are backward looking and only consider the past proposals recorded.
The ROC equilibrium then has the advantage of being more realistic than the Myerson or
Rubinstein solution since in the latter no bargaining actually takes place.
Furthermore, the reason why the players have an incentive to make concessions in the
ROC game is very simple and intuitive. Consider the simplest case in which there are
at most two steps, the amount to share is K = 1 and the threat point payos are (0; 0).
Assume that each player proposes, at each step, to keep everything, K = 1. Then, the
history of proposals is: h1 = [x1 = (1; 0); y1 = (0; 1)]; h2 = [x2 = (1; 0); y2 = (0; 1)]. At
the end, the lottery draws (1; 0) and (0; 1) with equal probabilities. Then, a best reply for
each player is to make a concession at the second step. Indeed, Player i can increase his
expected payo by making a concession c, just large enough for his opponent to prefer
this sure payo than to implement the first step lottery. Then, with probability 1/2 he will
be in the previous situation but with probability 1/2 he will get K   c.
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3 Experimental Design and Procedure
The main purpose of our study is to compare three distinct negotiation procedures by
means of six controlled and independent experimental treatments, two for each negotia-
tion procedures, that is, a free negotiation scheme, a compulsory mechanism, the Final
Oer Arbitration (FOA) and a non compulsory mechanism, the Recursive Oer Concil-
iation (ROC). For each negotiation procedure we run both a symmetric and asymmetric
case concerning incentives of negotiation parties. Our experimental design implements for
each treatment two tasks: (i) a repeated negotiation procedure in a bargaining experiment
and (ii) an experiment for eliciting risk attitudes among experimental subjects. The only
dierence among treatments refers to the design of the first task (i). In general, all condi-
tions were kept as much as possible identical. In all treatments, the first task represented
an experiment where two bargaining parties had to sequentially negotiate to share a pie of
22,2 euros (throughout the whole treatment 1 point were worth 1e.) whereas the second
task implemented an individual test for the elicitation of individual risk aversion.
3.1 Design
Part I: The negotiation
The subjects were introduced to the specific negotiation framework by providing detailed
instructions of task 1 of the experiment. Subjects were not aware that a second task was
present up to the end of task 1. In the following, the common features of the negotiation
schemes among the treatments are described.
The bargaining parties were involved in a repeated negotiation procedure over 10 iden-
tical periods adopting a stranger matching. At the beginning of each period, subjects were
randomly and anonymously paired, this being common knowledge among participants.
Each period consisted of a fixed number (five) of negotiation steps. After the fifth step the
negotiation was finished and the following period was starting. Each step of the negotiation
reproduced an alternating oer scheme. A randomly selected (at each step of each period)
first proponent was requested to propose to split the pie. Only after his proposal was made
publicly available, in turn the second proponent was in the position to agree and thus finish
the negotiation by proposing the compatible proposal or to reject the opponent’s proposal
by counter-oering a non-compatible proposal. For instance, Let’s suppose that bargainer
X was selected to be the first proponent at step s, he had then to propose a split of the pie of
22.2 points between the two parties. He was only allowed to make one oer x =(x, 22.2-
x), being x the amount kept for him, within a set of eleven symmetric alternatives X, i.e.,
x 2 X = f(0.0, 22.2), (2.2, 20.0), (4.4, 17.8), (6.7, 15.5), (8.9, 13.3), (11.1, 11.1), (13.3,
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8.9), (15.5, 6.7), (17.8, 4.4), (20.0, 2.2), (22.2, 0.0)g1. Let’s assume xs =(13.3, 8.9). In
turn, bargainer Y had the chance to make a counteroer y 2 Y = f:::; (y; 22:2 y); :::g, being
Y the same set of alternatives. The choice of bargainer Y can determine the agreement and
the end of the negotiation in case he proposes ys =(8.9, 13.3). We define this counter-oer
a compatible proposal (ys; xs). In case of rejection, i.e., bargainer Y oer a non-compatible
proposal. After this proposal is made available, both subjects are requested to explicitly
decide if to continue the negotiation and to proceed to the next step (if s=5 the bargaining
automatically ends) or to end the negotiation by declaring it. In this latter situation, the
three negotiation protocols dier as follows.
Free negotiation mechanism: FREE
The key point distinguishing the Free scheme to the following ones is the way subjects can
accept or reject opponents’ oers. Subjects can only agree on a proposal of their oppo-
nent by counter-oering a compatible proposal within the 5 bargaining steps. On the other
hand, subjects can cause the failure of the negotiation either by always counter-oering
non compatible proposals up to the fifth steps or by ending at any time the negotiation, that
is, it suces that only one bargainer declares his/her intention to stop the negotiation after
a generic negotiation step. In both opting-out cases, subjects receive their payos at the
threat point (x˚; y˚). The threat point can be symmetric or asymmetric, we have considered
the two possibilities for studying dierent incentive structures. In particular, we have con-
sidered (x˚ = 0; y˚ = 0) as far as the symmetric case is concerned, and (x˚ = 8; y˚ = 2) for the
second asymmetric case2. It is worth noting that in the latter case, experimental subjects
kept their role for the whole experiment, that is, after reading the generic instructions they
were randomly selected before starting the experimental session to play endowed with one
of the two threat point and this was obviously common knowledge since the beginning.
Recursive Oer Conciliation mechanism: ROC
ROC is conceived as a non-compulsory arbitration mechanism, that is, bargainers adopt it
as a structured bargaining procedure which may help them to find an agreement. There-
fore, the mechanism does not implement any compulsory third-party decision, each bar-
gainer has one strategy to cause the failure of the negotiation and get his opting out op-
tion (x˚; y˚). Because of the non-compulsory nature of this procedure, we have adopted an
identical incentives in both symmetric and asymmetric cases, that is, we have considered
1We adopted non integer values in order to avoid the identification of focal alternatives. For instance, it
would had been the case, if we would had selected only integer values between 0 an 10, where an obvious
focal points would had been 5.
2Being the threat point a focal point we adopted integer values
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(x˚ = 0; y˚ = 0) for the former case and (x˚ = 8; y˚ = 2) for the latter case.
The mechanism is therefore identical to the free mechanism, except for the fact that by
opting out they are involved in a mechanism which implements a third-party decision on
their track of past proposals. In particular, given that bargainers opt out at step s, a random
lottery draws one of the two oers proposed at step s, i.e., xs or ys. If the oer made by
bargainer X is chosen (xs), bargainer Y is faced with the decision to accept the oer or
to reject it. The rejection implies that another lottery is implemented to choose between
the two oers proposed at step s   1, i.e., xs 1 or ys 1 and the bargainer whose oer has
not been chosen is faced with the decision to accept the opponent’s oer or continue the
lottery mechanism considering now proposal made at step s   2. This mechanism is re-
peated recursively unless one of the two bargainers accepts the opponent’s proposal or the
recursive mechanisms reach step s = 0. In this latter case, the negotiation fails and the
bargainers get their threat point payos (x˚; y˚).
Final Oer Arbitration mechanism: FOA
FOA is a compulsory arbitration mechanism. Bargainers, if involved in such mechanism,
cannot stop the negotiation without asking for and accepting the arbitrator’s decision. The
FOA mechanism is identical to the FREE mechanism except for the opportunities to opt-
out. Similarly, subjects can only agree on a proposal of their opponent by counter-oering
a compatible proposal within the 5 bargaining steps. On the other hand, subjects every-
time they opt-out from proposing, they accept to rely on the arbitrator’s decision, this
obviously occur even if they fail to reach an agrement within the five steps. The arbitra-
tor’s decision is made by selecting one of the two final oers, that is, xs or ys, given that
the negotiation ended at step s. Therefore no (x˚; y˚) threat point is defined.
In order to reproduce similar negotiation incentives for running both a symmetric and
an asymmetric case, we have decided to adopt two dierent probability distributions for
modeling the uncertainty of the arbitrator’s decision-making process. In the symmetric
treatment, the subjects knew that the two final opting-out non-compatible proposals (xs or
ys, being s the last step of the negotiation) were drawn with equal probabilities. In the
asymmetric treatment, the principle according to which the arbitrator decides between the
two proposals is based on a random selection according to some probability distributions
defined over the alternatives X. The idea behind this mechanisms is to mimic the realistic
situation where bargainers have visibility of the track of record of previous arbitrator’s
decision on similar cases. Bargainers can extrapolate a probabilistic decision model of
the arbitrator and make decision accordingly. This is similar to the method implemented
by Ashenfelter et al. (1994). The probability distribution has been estimated in order to
reproduce a similar incentive structure as the two previous asymmetric negotiation pro-
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tocols, that is, we have adopted a normal distributions N(14:1; 2:7). The mean has been
determined in order to equally share the expected surplus of both bargainers in case of
opting-out values. In the case of ROC given the uniform random lottery and the threat
points (x˚ = 8; y˚ = 2), the expected surplus for player X were 4e, that is, 0e or 8e with
equal probability, and for player Y were 1e, that is, 0e or 2e with equal probability. To
keep the same dierence in terms of surplus between the two bargainers (3e), we decided
to consider a mean of 11.1e+3e=14.1e. The nice properties is that the mean almost over-
laps with one of the alternatives of the bargainers 13.8e. The standard deviation had been
estimated in order to guarantee that all arbitrator’s decision fell within the alternatives,
that is, three standard deviations plus the mean are equal to the maximum alternatives
(2:7  3 + 14:1 = 22:2).
Together with the instructions, in Period 1, bargainers received the bargaining record con-
sisting of 50 arbitrator’s decision for each possible couple of oer and counter-oer. An
example is provided in Figure 4. The instructions (in French) were reporting the whole list
 
  T1    -    T2 :                      Arbitrator’s decision 
 
(17.8 - 4.4):       xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx x xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xx  
(2.2 - 20.0):                  x         x      x x                x    
  
(20.0 - 2.2):       xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xx  xxxxxx  
(2.2 - 20.0):                     x        x       x       x  xx        
  
(17.8 - 4.4):       xxx xxxx xx xx xx x xxxxxx x xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx x     
(6.7 - 15.5):          x    x  x  x  x x      x x   x            x xxx  
  
(20.0 - 2.2):       xx x  xxx xx xxxx  xxxxx x  x xx xxxx x     x xxx   
(6.7 - 15.5):         x xx   x  x    xx     x xx x  x    x xxxxx x   x  
  
(0.0 - 22.2):                                                           
(8.9 - 13.3):       xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
 
Figure 4: Track of record of previous arbitrator’s decision on similar cases. The x notation
is associated to only one arbitrator’s decision and where the choice between the oer and
counter-oer displayed in two consecutive lines. T1 stands for bargainers type 1, i.e.,
bargainers X.
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of possible oers, here a sparse subset is reported.
Part II: Risk Aversion Test
The second task is aimed for eliciting risk aversion for each subject. A standard Holt
and Laury’s elicitation procedure has been adopted (Holt and Laury (2002)). The pur-
pose was to collect information about the risk attitude of each subject in order to confirm
some theoretical hypothesis. It is worth noting that the elicitation of risk aversion would
be preferably implemented at the beginning of a treatment so to prevent the formation of
emotional biases aecting individuals’ risk attitudes. However, we have preferred to post-
pone this task in order to avoid a similar eect on the negotiation task as far as playing
lotteries is concerned. The proposed negotiation mechanisms implement lotteries for se-
lecting the order or proponents at each negotiation step and moreover for implementing
the opting out option in the two mechanisms.
3.2 Procedure
We had twelve experimental sessions, four for each of the three procedures (Free, FOA,
ROA), one for the symmetric treatment and three for the asymmetric treatment. Students
were recruited from University of Montpellier I and II via email (they were selected within
a database of more than 5000 students) soliciting participants for a decision-making ex-
periment of about 2 hours, with a reward that would depend on their decisions. For each
session twenty subjects were invited. The subjects entered the room and were told to
choose a position in the computerized room. Each position was properly isolated in order
to prevent subjects to see, communicate or simply disturb other subjects. Instructions (in
French) for part I were distributed at each desk in order to enable each participant to read
carefully the procedure of the experiment. After 10 minutes the same instructions were
read aloud to the subjects by the experimenter. Subjects were not informed that the exper-
iment would consist of two parts. They were informed about the second part as well as
supplied with a copy of their instructions (in French) only after part I was finished. Sub-
jects were not informed about the correct matching procedure, they were just told that a
stranger matching was implemented to select at each round the two negotiators. In reality,
the twenty subjects, were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Each group comprising
ten people was implementing a stranger treatment with one repetition (ten subjects for ten
periods). This strategy was adopted to increase the number of statistically independent
samples. In general, bargainers had complete information about the size of the pie, bar-
gaining cost, opponent’s payos and arbitration mechanism; thus, the game was designed
to be one of common knowledge. At the end of the read of the instructions, experimental
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subjects were informed that a first trial period identical to the following periods was im-
plemented to make themselves acquainted with the software interface. It was declared the
it was excluded from payment computation, accordingly we have not considered in our
empirical analysis.
After the end of part I, subjects were told about a second part relative to an anonymous
and individual test comprising a list of eleven lotteries. They were not informed about the
nature of the test and neither about the score/payment relative to part I of the experiment.
Finally, after the two experimental parts were finished an anonymous questionnaire (in
French) was submitted to each participant in order to collect some personal information
(range of age, sex, studies, ...) after which all subjects were informed about their personal
gains. The gains consisted of the final outcome of only one negotiation/period randomly
selected among the ten periods plus the outcome of only one lottery of the risk aversion
test. Approximately, both average payments were equal to 11.1 e. The attempt to equate
payments in both experimental parts has been done in order to keep similar monetary
incentives. They were then paid cash according to the experimental gains plus a fee of 5e.
The average earnings (including the show-up fee of 5e) per subject was approximately
(30e) for in average 2 hours of experimental session.
We conducted the experiments in the computerized lab of the Lameta - University
of Montpellier I. We run all sessions in two time-periods, end of May 2010 and end of
November 2010. One-hundred eighty subjects participated in the nine experimental ses-
sions. We did not restrict our sample of subjects, by the way they were mainly undergrad-
uate students (42% of men, average age 23) from dierent faculties, namely, Sciences,
Social and Political Science, Engineering and Mathematics. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Fi-
nally, it is worth remembering that a sample copy of each instruction (in French) is made
available on request.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Frequency of impasses
Our first objective will be to compare the three procedures Free, FOA and ROC in terms of
the frequency of bargaining impasses. First, we will do this comparison in the symmetric
treatment, in which the threat point in the Free and ROC procedures is (0,0), while, in the
FOA procedure, the final oers are drawn with equal probabilities.
Result 1: In the symmetric treatment, the frequency of impasses is equivalent in the
Free (12%) and in the ROC (11%) procedures. The frequency of impasses in the FOA
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procedure is much higher (76%).
In the asymmetric treatment, at the beginning of each session, a number 2 or 8 was
randomly attributed to each subject. In the Free and ROC procedures, these numbers rep-
resented the subjects’payments at the threat point. In the FOA procedure, the arbitrator’s
choices were drawn from a normal distribution centered on the ESS (14.1;8.1), with a
standard deviation 2.7.
Result 2: In the asymmetric treatment, the frequency of impasses is equivalent in the
Free procedure (18.3%) and in the ROC procedure (19.3%). The frequency of impasses in
the FOA procedure is much higher (74.5%).
The dierence between the high frequency of impasses in the FOA procedure and the
rather low frequency in the Free procedure is in line with most of the results in the experi-
mental literature (see for example Ashenfelter et al. 1992 or Dickinson 2006) and can be
interpreted as the observation of a chilling eect generated by FOA, as described in the
empirical and theoretical literature. In addition, these first two results show that the ROC
procedure does not generate a chilling eect.
Result 3: In the FOA procedure, the frequency of impasses is equivalent in the sym-
metric treatment (76%) and in the asymmetric treatment (74,5%).
We could have expected that the frequency of impasses had been dierent in the sym-
metric and the asymmetric treatments in the FOA procedure. The observation reported in
Result 3, such that the frequencies are equivalent in both cases, may be a consequence of
the diculty, for the subjects, to understand the graphs provided. Maybe, it was not clear
enough that the arbitrator had specific preferences in the asymmetric treatment and did not
choose randomly. This would also explain the hight frequency of impasses in the experi-
ment described by Ashenfelter et al. (1992), when they first introduced this representation
of the arbitrator’s preferences. However, we will not investigate further in this direction
since this is not the point of this paper. On the contrary, we are interested in situations in
which the parties to the negotiation do not think that the arbitrator has clear preferences
on the outcome.
Result 4: In the Free and the ROC procedures, the frequency of impasses are higher
in the asymmetric treatment than in the symmetric one (18.3% as opposed to 12% in the
Free procedure and 19.3% as opposed to 11% in the ROC procedure).
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The fact that the frequency of impasses is higher in the asymmetric treatment in the two
other procedures, Free and ROC, is maybe due to the the fact that, in that case, there are
two competing focal agreements. Equal Split (ES), which corresponds to a general social
norm, is still a focal agreement. However, in comparison with the symmetric treatment,
in the asymmetric treatment Equal Split of the Surplus (14.1;8.1) is a new focal point
(see Knez and Camerer 1995 for this type of interpretation). The subjects do not have
the possibility to choose the proposal which corresponds to ESS since it is not on the list
provided (see the list in subsection 3.1), but if they had this principle in mind, they could
choose the closest proposals, (13.3;8.9) and (15.5;6.7). We will elaborate on this point in
the following Subsection 4.3.
4.2 Evolution of the bargaining process
We will discuss now what we observed about the process of the negotiation under the
dierent procedures. We know that, at the theoretical equilibrium of the Myerson game,
which constitutes the theoretical basis for the Free procedure, the two players find an
agreement immediately. In the FOA game, the two players may opt out at every step and
their proposals are always the same and extreme in the symmetric case which corresponds
to a situation in which the arbitrator has no specific preferences and just flips a coin. In
the asymmetric case which corresponds to a case in which the arbitrator has a preferred
outcome, the result depends on the players’ belief about the arbitrator’s preferred outcome.
In the ROC game, at the equilibrium the two players make gradual concessions and at the
dominant equilibrium they pursue the negotiation until the end date.
Result 5: In the Free procedure, when the subjects reach an agreement in the symmet-
ric treatment, this is at the first step with a hight frequency (47.7%). In the asymmetric
treatment, this is at the last step with a hight frequency (67.3%).
The subjects’ behavior described in Result 5, does not coincide with the equilibrium of
the Myerson game. In the symmetric treatment, the subjects reach an agreement immedi-
ately, and we will see in the next subsection that this agreement coincides with Equal Split
(ES). However, we do not think that the subjects ”play” the equilibrium of the Myerson
game, which is not necessarily ES when there are 5 steps. Our interpretation is that the
subjects choose ES in this case because it is a focal point and coincides with an obvious
social norm. This would explain also why, in the asymmetric treatment in which there is
no obvious unique focal agreement, the subjects negotiate until the end.
Result 6: In the ROC procedure, when the subjects reach an agreement in the sym-
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metric and asymmetric treatments, this is either at the last step or during the arbitration
with a hight frequency (60.7% in the symmetric treatment and 70.7% in the asymmetric
treatment).
On the opposite, the subjects’ behavior described in Result 6 coincides with the play-
ers’ behavior at the theoretical equilibrium of the ROC game.
4.3 Nature of the agreements reached
Now, in order to go further in the description of the subjects’ behavior, we will discuss the
type of agreements which are reached under the dierent procedures. Some proposals in
the list that was available to the subjects should be considered in particular (see Subsec-
tion 3.1). As a matter of notation and except if the contrary is specified, in the asymmetric
treatments, the first number in the proposal will be the Type 8’s amount. In the symmet-
ric treatments, the extreme proposal (22.2;0) would be made by pure Nash players in the
FOA procedure and at the first step of the ROC procedure. In the asymmetric treatments of
the Free and Roc procedures, the extreme proposals are in theory (20.2;2) and (8.9;13.3),
since a player is not supposed to make a proposal which is below his opponent’s threat
point payment. These extreme proposals are chosen by pure Nash players at the first step
of the ROC procedure and at the theoretical equilibrium in a Myerson procedure with only
one step, which is equivalent to an ultimatum game. The Equal Split (ES) (11.1;11.1), is
the Raia solution of the symmetric bargaining game of course, but it is also considered
by the subjects as a social norm in many experiments on bargaining (see Roth 1995). This
is the case even when the design of the experiment is not symmetric (Knez and Camerer
1995). Finally, in the asymmetric treatments, the proposal (14.1;8.1) would be the Equal
Split of the Surplus (ESS). This proposal is not on the list, but the closest proposals are
(13.3;8.9) and (15.5;6.7). Therefore, these two proposals would constitute the nearest ap-
proximation of ESS.
Result 7: Under the Free procedure, in the symmetric treatment, the agreements
reached are ES with a hight frequency (77 over 88, 87.5%).
Result 8: Under the FOA procedure, in the symmetric treatment, the extreme proposal
(22.2;0) is drawn by the lottery in 44.8% of the cases (39 over 87).
Result 9: Under the ROC procedure, in the symmetric treatment, the compatible pro-
posals are ES with a very hight frequency (38 over 40) but only 20 over 49 agreements
drawn by the lottery are ES.
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Results in the symmetric treatments are not surprising. When the subjects reach an
agreement, this is the focal agreement ES with a very hight frequency under the Free and
ROC procedures. It is also the case in the FOA procedure but the number of agreements
reached by the subjects is too low (9 ES over 13 agreements). The fact that the extreme
proposal is drawn with a high frequency by the FOAmeans that, when the subject disagree
and ask for arbitration, they make extreme proposals. This coincides with the maximal
chilling eect described at the theoretical equilibrium. Under the ROC procedure, the fact
that the compatible proposals are essentially all ES, while it appears with a rather low
frequency among the proposals drawn by the lottery coincides with the theoretical equi-
librium. When the players want to avoid the arbitration, for example because there is a
small cost of arbitration or a small discounting, they reach the agreement at the last step.
Otherwise, they call for an arbitration with non compatible but close proposals (Tanimura
and Thoron 2008).
Result 10: In the asymmetric treatment of the FOA procedure, if we consider all the
agreements reached by the subjects, 80.4% are ES. Among the agreements either reached
by the subjects or imposed by the arbitrator, 35.5% are ES and 46% are (13.3;8.9) or
(15.5;6.7).
Result 11: In the asymmetric treatments in the two other procedures, if we consider
all the agreements reached, more than 55% are ES in the Free procedure, as opposed to
41.7% in the ROC procedure. Agreements (13.3;8.9) or (15.5;6.7) appear with a frequency
of 36.3% in the Free procedure as opposed to 45.87% in the ROC procedure.
Result 10 and 11 show that in the asymmetric treatment, the ROC procedure does better
than the Free procedure in helping the subjects to reach the agreements which are closest
to the ESS. Under the FOA procedure, the subjects are unable to reach these agreements
on their own. However, since the arbitrator’s preferences are centered on the agreement
(14.1;8.1), overall, the agreements close to the ESS constitute the outcome in 46 percent
of the cases. Therefore, the ROC procedure is as ecient as the FOA procedure in helping
the subjects find the ESS but without imposing the agreement on the subjects. In this
respect, the advantage of the ROC procedure over the FOA procedure is that the outcome
does not depend on the arbitrator’s preferences. In comparison, in the symmetric treatment
of the FOA procedure, when the arbitrator has no preferences on the outcome, the extreme
proposals in which one subjects keep everything, appears with a frequency of 40%. In
other words, when FOA is made available to negotiators, a risk is taken that, in certain
situations, the arbitrator does not have a preferred outcome and just flip a coin. In these
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situations, the compulsory arbitration may result in very unfair agreements. This problem
does not occur under a ROC procedure.
5 Conclusion
We ran a series of experiments to test the eectiveness of a new mechanism presented
in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron 2008). The ROC mechanism was proposed
to help two parties to negotiate. It is a modified version of the FOA compulsory arbitra-
tion mechanism. We observed that the ROC procedure does not increase the frequency
of impasses in comparison with the Free procedure. Therefore, a first important conclu-
sion of our experiment is that, contrary to what happens with the FOA mechanism, the
ROC mechanism does not generate what is designated in the literature as the chilling ef-
fect often discussed in the literature. Secondly, subjects do actually bargain for several
steps which is not consistent with the standard theoretical results but which is consistent
with the theoretical predictions for the ROC procedure. Furthermore, the ROC mechanism
helps the subjects to agree around the Equal Split of the Surplus which can be considered
as a ”fair” agreement in an asymmetric treatment. Indeed, when two players have dierent
threat point payments, the simple Equal Split of the amount to be shared is chosen with
a lower frequency in the ROC procedure than in the Free procedure. Therefore, the ROC
mechanism seems to cumulate the advantages of the two other procedures. It avoids the
high frequency of impasses observed in the FOA procedure and it is as ecient as the
Free procedure in this respect. The ROC mechanism helps the subjects to find a ”fair”
agreement, as the arbitrator of the FOA mechanism does when the arbitrator has specific
preferences as to the outcome of the negotiation, but has the merit of not being compulsory.
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Figure 5: FREE symmetric.
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Figure 9: FOA asymmetric.
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